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This paper investigates how China entered in the WTO and what are the major problems 
that the country faced due to its non-market economy (NME). Thus, the paper analyzed 
the main critics and advances in China since its entrance on WTO. Above all, to answer 
the following questions: what is China's role in WTO? What aspects the country believe 
that should be improved? Through the hypothetical-deductive method, this paper intents 
to understand China's position, as a state capitalist country in an Organization that seeks 
global free trade, indicating its efforts, hurdles, necessities and failures in its path to adapt 
to WTO requirements, as well as, how China can contribute to the development of the 
Organization through its proposals. 
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RESUMO 
Este artigo investiga o ingresso da China na OMC e quais foram os maiores problemas 
enfrentados pelo país dada a sua economia de não mercado. Dessa forma, o artigo 
analisou as principais críticas e avanços chineses desde sua entrada na OMC. 
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Sobretudo, para responder as questões: qual o papel da China na OMC? Quais aspectos 
o país acredita que devam ser melhorados? Através do método hipotético-dedutivo, o 
artigo examina a posição chinesa, país capitalista de estado, em uma Organização que 
busca o livre comércio global, indicando seus esforços, obstáculos, necessidades e 
falhas em seu caminho para se adaptar aos requisitos da OMC e, através de suas 
propostas, investiga como a China pode contribuir para o desenvolvimento da OMC. 
 





Este artículo investiga la entrada de China en la OMC y cuáles fueron los mayores 
problemas que enfrentaba el país debido su economía planificada. Así, el trabajo analizó 
las principales críticas y avances chinos desde su ingreso a la OMC. Sobre todo, para 
responder a las preguntas: ¿cuál es el papel de China en la OMC? ¿Qué aspectos cree 
el país que deben mejorarse? A través del método hipotético-deductivo, este trabajo 
examina la posición de China, como país capitalista de estado en una Organización que 
busca el libre comercio global, señalando sus esfuerzos, obstáculos, necesidades y 
fracasos en su camino para adaptarse a los requisitos de la OMC y cómo China puede 
contribuir al desarrollo de la Organización a través de sus propuestas. 
 






China has experienced astounding economic growth over the course of the last 
forty years, by creating word-class industries the country is marching towards a global 
technology leadership. In this development path, after 15 years of negotiations, China 
joined WTO in 2001 and nowadays performs a central role in international trade. 
China's government influence in economy is considered a hurdle to a multilateral 
trading system that seeks free trade, so as a requirement in order to join WTO, China has 
undertaken obligations to remodel its economy from a non-market to a market one. Even 
after the reforms, the State still plays an important role in China's economy raising several 
conflicts within the Organization. For this reason, this paper seeks to answer the following 
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questions: what is China's role in WTO? What aspects the country believe that should be 
improved? After all, China's is the world's second-largest economy and the major 
commodity exporter, therefore, analyze China's hybrid economy, its role and proposals in 
WTO are not only important to improve international trade but also to understand what 
are the consequences of having a major global economy with non-market traits within a 
multilateral trading system.  
In order to achieve the proposed objectives, this paper is divided into three parts. 
First, through the historic method the non-market definition will be analyzed, as well as, 
how these economies adapted to multilateral trading systems, from GATT to WTO. All of 
this, to provide enough context to investigate China's WTO Accession Protocol and its 
main requirements. In the next part, through historical and observational methods, China's 
role in WTO was analyzed, highlighting its constant conflicts with the US, illustrated 
through WTO disputes. Also, China's advances towards a market economy were 
indicated, as well as, its main critics regarding government interference in trade, especially 
the ones related to anti-dumping rates and countervailing duties. In the last part, trough 
historical and observational methods, China's proposed WTO reforms were analyzed in 
order to understand what points the country belief should be improved within the 
Organization. At last in conclusion, the proposed questions were answered. 
 
 
2. NON-MARKET ECONOMIES AT GATT AND WTO 
 
Although several Organizations and countries highlight the government influence 
in economic decisions as an essential attribute to classify a non-market economy (NME), 
there is no consolidate and clear definition of what in fact is this economy model.  
Some organizations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) defines a NME as ''a national economy in which the government 
seeks to determine economic activity largely through a mechanism of central planning''. 
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Others like the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) don't present a clear 
definition, just some patterns analyzed trough papers and researches, classifying them as 
''countries in which the State does not play an active role to promote competition and 
avoid monopolies'' therefore establishing ''a complete or substantially complete monopoly 
of its trade where all domestic prices are fixed by the State''1. 
However, it remains clear that NME are opposed to market economies (ME), a 
national economy of a country that relies heavily upon market forces to determine levels 
of production, consumption, investment and savings without government intervention. The 
difficulty to define a country as a NME boosted after the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
collapse of communist regimes. Nowadays, countries have at most a mixed economy with 
ME and NME traits2. 
In this scenario, the first successful attempt to establish a multilateral trading 
system was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multilateral treaty 
created after the World War II as a provisional solution until the creation of what it was 
supposed to be the International Trade Organization (ITO)3.  
Seeking to promote international trade liberalization, mainly trough tariff reduction 
the first major problem faced by GATT was Czechoslovakia transition to a centrally 
planned economy (and therefore a NME) in the '50s. The Agreement did not provide any 
proper alternative for calculating the normal value of goods in the domestic market of 
centrally planned economies, which could cause disturbances in dumping4 margins 
 
1 THORSTENSEN, Vera; RAMOS, Daniel; BERTOLACCINI, C. M. E. F. OMC e economias não de 
mercado: o caso híbrido da China. Revista Brasileira de Comércio Exterior, Rio de Janeiro, v. 116, p. 
72-100, dec./2005. p. 75 and 78. 
2 THORSTENSEN, Vera; RAMOS, Daniel; BERTOLACCINI, C. M. E. F., op. cit., p. 88. 
3 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh. Available at:  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm. Access on: 24 mar. 2020. Access on: 29 
apr. 2020.  
4 According to the Brazilian Ministry of economy, industry, foreign trade and services dumping is a unfair 
trade practice in which a company exports a product at a price below to the price of this same product in its 
domestic market. To offset this practice some countries use anti-dumping measures. In: MINISTÉRIO DA 
ECONOMIA, INDÚSTRIA, COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR E SERVIÇOS. Dumping. Available at: 
http://www.mdic.gov.br/index.php/comercio-exterior/defesa-comercial/205-assuntos/categ-comercio-
exterior/defesa-comercial-e-interesse-publico/defesa-comercial-2/o-que-e-defesa-comercial/1768-
dumping. Access on: 29 apr. 2020.  
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calculations. As a solution, Czechoslovakia proposed an average comparable price for 
the like product for export by third countries. Although GATT contracting members did not 
accept the proposal, this solution was in fact used as a common alternative methodology5. 
In the '60s Yugoslavia, already a NME, in order to join GATT was compelled to 
adapt its trade policies as regards the elimination of state intervention in the activities of 
companies and private business decisions, the adoption of customs tariffs, promoting a 
reform of the price-fixing system, allowing free prices for a range of commodities and 
removing certain price limits for basic industries and the decentralization of investment 
resources, reducing the government's role in investment financing. 
In 1966, although Yugoslavia was still clearly a non-market economy, the country 
joined GATT. Although the official argument is that the reforms undertaken by the country 
were sufficient to allow its participation in the multilateral trading system, it is speculated 
that its acceptance was politically triggered, in order to contain Soviet influence in the 
region.6. 
In the next year, Poland joined GATT. Besides making the same adaptations as 
Czechoslovakia, the negotiation of its concessions was made on the basis of import 
quotas, as well as, a safeguard mechanism was created allowing import restrictions from 
Poland products, fearing its increase based on non-market conditions of exportation. 
These adaptations were also made when Romania joined in 1971 and Hungary in 19737. 
As a result of the GATT Uruguay Round in 1995, the WTO was created and 
opposed to its predecessor the Organization was not seeking to adapt its system in order 
to accommodate ENM countries. In addition, after the end of the Cold War (in 1991) the 
countries that decided to join WTO were in fact willing to undertake significant economic 
reforms to transform their systems into market-oriented economies8. 
 
5 THORSTENSEN et al. Acessão da China à OMC: a questão da economia de não mercado. FGV EESP - 
CCGI - Papers. p. 1-19, 2014. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16363. Access on: 19 sep. 2019. p. 
02 and 03. 
6 THORSTENSEN et al, op.cit., p. 03 
7 Ibidem, p. 04. 
8 Ibidem, p. 04. 
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Therefore, in order to join WTO, some countries were required to transform its 
economies to a market-oriented model, based on the following topics: exchange, state 
ownership and privatization, pricing policies, commercial rights, subsidies, industrial 
policy, state-owned commercial enterprises and transparency. For this purpose, the WTO 
established a deadline to execute some of these obligations, based on the need of each 
country. As a result, former NME countries such as Mongolia, Bulgaria, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Lithuania and Moldova joined the 
Organization. The first major former NME economy to join WTO was China in 2001, 
followed by Vietnam in 2007 and Russia in 20129.  
The negotiation process that leaded China to join WTO lasted 15 years. Among 
several hurdles, the USA - China bilateral agreement concluded in 1999 was one of the 
main elements that paved the way for China's accession10. According to Wei Liang, the 
USA - China agreement can be divided into three phases, starting from China's attempt 
to rejoin GATT in 1986 to seek, among other goals, greater defenses against 
protectionism, unconditional most-favored-nation treatment and improvement of export 
and foreign direct investment11.  
Based on its financial contribution to the organization, its voting strength and 
relevance in the world economy, the US was the leading state that negotiated terms with 
China. Considering that GATT rules were made on the premise to be followed by market 
economies, a GATT Working Party was organized to learn more about China's trade 
regime, laws and regulations. However, after the end of the Cold War, the west has 
changed its approach towards China, the last important holdout of the communist 
ideology. Moreover, motivated by the incident with the protest in Tianamen Square, the 
 
9 THORSTENSEN et al, op.cit., p. 05 
10 LAI, Hongyi Harry. Behind China's World Trade Organization Agreement with the USA. Third World 
Quarterly, United Kingdom, v. 22, nº. 02, p. 237-255, Apr./2001. p. 237 
11 LIANG, Wei. China's WTO Negotiation Process and its Implications. Journal of Contemporary China, 
v. 11, nº 33, p. 683 - 719, aug./ 2010. p. 683-685 
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US implemented economic sanctions against China in 1989, tracing obstacles in the 
second phase of negotiation12. 
Furthermore, against China's desire, Taiwan applied to join GATT in 1990, 
rushing China's eagerness to break the deadlock in negotiations. Taking advantage of the 
situation the US negotiated new compromises with China. However, some of the US 
demands were rejected by China, mainly regarding its status as a developed country 
instead of a developing one and a commitment to move to a full market economy, as well 
as, other measures regarding its planned economy. With not enough concessions, China 
entered in another deadlock in 199413. 
In the last phase, already concerning the WTO accession, China decided to use 
more flexible and realistic methods which resulted in bilateral market access negotiations 
with nearly 20 WTO members in 1997. As a result, in March of 1999, a consensus in many 
past issues between China and the US led Premier Zhu to meet President Clinton in order 
to conclude the negotiation. However, motivated by the US Congress' disapproval, Clinton 
decided to not sign the agreement. One month later, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade delayed the negotiations in four 
months, resumed after a compensation payment. Finally, in November of 1999, the US-
China bilateral agreement was concluded. Followed, in less than a year, by the EU-China 
agreement, these two agreements paved the way to China join the organization14. 
Above all, as a requirement to join WTO, an Accession Protocol15 was made 
covering points which the Chinese economy must change in order to be a market - 
oriented one. Among them, some will be highlighted to understand the core of the WTO 
disputes involving China. 
Regarding foreign individuals and enterprises, China must treat them under the 
WTO non-discrimination principle, granting no less favorable treatment than that offered 
 
12 Ibidem, p. 688 e 693 
13 LIANG, Wei, op. cit., p. 693, 694, 695 and 698 
14 Ibidem, p. 706 - 711. 
15 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. China. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm. Access on: 29 apr. 2020.  
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to the national market (article 3). Based on the same principle, according to article 5, all 
Chinese enterprises progressively shall have the right to trade (export and import) all 
goods throughout the customs territory of China, with some exceptions listed in this same 
Protocol16. 
Considering the State role in the NME economies the Protocol requires in its 
article 6 that import purchasing procedures of state trading enterprises are fully 
transparent and refrain from taking any measure to influence or direct state trading 
enterprises. Moreover, China shall eliminate and cease to enforce trade and foreign 
exchange balancing requirements through laws, regulations or other measures, ensuring 
the distribution of import licenses, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, or any other means of 
approval for importation or investment by national and sub-national authorities (article 7)17. 
Furthermore, based on the difficulties to identify subsidies in ENM economies, as 
well as, arbitrate their specificity during investigations of compensatory measures the 
Accession Protocol article 10 classifies subsidies18 provided to state-owned enterprises 
as specific if, state-owned enterprises are the predominant recipients or receive 
disproportionately large amounts of them19. 
Regarding prices for traded goods and services in every sector, China shall allow 
them to be determined by market forces (article 9). To anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures investigations the Protocol in, its article 15, foresee mechanisms in which 
special rules can be used to determine price comparability, since prevailing terms and 
 
16 THORSTENSEN et al, op. cit, p. 02 and 04. 
17 THORSTENSEN et al, op. cit., p. 05 
18According to Brazilian Ministry of economy, industry, foreign trade and services subsidy is the practice of 
grant benefits trough any form of income or price support that, directly or indirectly, contributes to increase 
exports or reduce imports of any product or the existence of financial contribution by a government or public 
body, within the territory of the exporting country. A subsidy is considered specific when the granting 
authority, or the legislation in force, explicitly limits access to the subsidy to one or a group of companies or 
industries, branches of production, or geographic regions. Subsidies are offset by countervailing measures. 
In: MINISTÉRIO DA ECONOMIA, INDÚSTRIA, COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR E SERVIÇOS. Os subisídios. 
Available at: http://www.mdic.gov.br/index.php/comercio-exterior/defesa-comercial/205-assuntos/categ-
comercio-exterior/defesa-comercial-e-interesse-publico/defesa-comercial-2/o-que-e-defesa-
comercial/1775-medidas-os-subsidios. Access on: 29 apr. 2020. 
19 THORSTENSEN et al, op. cit, p. 07 
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conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate benchmarks. These 
provisions shall expire 15 years after the date of accession (until 2016) likewise China 
shall ensure that market economy conditions prevail over non-market ones20. 
However, even years after China has joined WTO, there are still debates on 
whether or not China has become a true market economy. Given the lack of a unified 
definition, some countries as the United States still classify a few WTO members as a 
NME, more specifically, under US Law the following countries are considered non-market 
economies: Belarus, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, the People’s Republic of China, the 
Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic 
of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and 
Turkmenistan21. 
Although US classification is not a consensus (Brazil, for example, considers 
China a market economy since 200422) it is a common judgment among other relevant 
China trade partners such as India, Europe Union, Canada and Mexico23. 
Thus, in an attempt to analyze China's role in WTO, the next part will investigate 
some of China's advances and in which points is criticized, as well as, some of the 
disputes in which China take part, measuring the hurdles and consequences of a major 








20 Ibidem, p. 06 and 09.  
21 MERCATUS CENTER GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY. Is China a Non-Market Economy?. Available 
at: https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/china-non-market-economy. Access on: 19 sep. 2019. 
22 THORSTENSEN et al., op. cit., p. 83 
23 PUCCIO, Laura. Granting Market Economy Status to China. Members' Research Service. European 
Union, p. 01 - 28, nov./2015. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/cbc9d72b-
b9c0-11e5-8d3c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en . Access on: 29 apr. 2020. p. 08 
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3. CHINA AS A WTO MEMBER 
 
Considering China as a major driver of global economic growth and trade, its 
adequacy towards an economy oriented by market forces was an important step in WTO 
history. Since its entrance in the organization, the country assumed an important role, 
evolving from a timid and defensive position to an assertive and demanding stance.24. 
According to WTO Police Trade Review25, China has made some improvements 
headed for a market economy: 
 
''Under the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), the authorities intend to continue 
the process of structural economic reform, which includes the promotion of private 
sector participation in the economy, as well as the reform of SOEs, while keeping 
the preponderance of public ownership. Other measures mentioned in the Plan 
include the promotion of competition, fiscal reform, financial sector reform to 
increase private capital participation in banking and expand the provision of 
financial services, and making the exchange rate and interest rate more market-
oriented''. 
 
Furthermore, in 2016 the People's Bank of China (PBOC) changed to a more 
market-based approach of conducting monetary policy, involving closer management of 
liquidity in the banking system. Although major monetary policy decisions on benchmark 
lending and deposit rates continue to go through the State Council, PBOC set rates on 
money market instruments and uses a corridor or an interest rate band, adjusting liquidity 
in the money markets, PBOC can influence its position within the corridor. According to 
WTO, ''the upper limit is set by its overnight seven-day and one-month standing lending 
facilities, while the lower rate is the interest paid by the PBOC on excess deposit 
reserves''26. 
 
24 PERES, Ana Luísa Soares; DAIBERT, Leticia. A China e a Organização Mundial do Comércio. In: Direito 
Chinês Comtemporâneo, 2015. p. 387-412. p. 399 
25 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. TRADE POLICY REVIEW. REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT: 
CHINA. WT/TPR/S/375/Rev.1, 14 sep. 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp475_e.htm. Access on: 19 sep. 2019. p. 09 
26 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. TRADE POLICY REVIEW. op. cit, p. 19 
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In the multilateral trade sector, China's President Xi Jiping announced the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) that includes a network of ports, roads, railways, airports, power 
plants, oil and gas pipelines and refineries, as well as, free trade zones. According to WTO 
Trade Policy27 the Initiative aims to increase connectivity between the Asian, European 
and African continents and therefore ''enhancing trade flows and spur long-term regional 
economic growth and development, benefiting all those involved''. 
Other measures described includes: an Anti-Monopoly Law which introduces 
provisions on the prevention of unfair competition activities carried out by technological 
means on the Internet, such as malicious interference and the elimination of price controls 
on certain items in 2017 including explosive materials, tobacco leaves, certain drugs, and 
some construction projects28. 
Regardless of these advances, China is still a target of anti-dumping measures, 
since the country is still considered a NME by some WTO members (even after the 
provisions of the Access Protocol had expired in 2016). According to the US, Japan and 
EU some distortions in the Chinese economy caused by government intervention would 
make it impractical in many cases to use Chinese prices and costs for determining 
dumping margins29. 
Among these distortions, China is criticized for consecutive devaluations of the 
Yuan. Soares and Daibert30 argued that China constantly intervenes in the exchange rate 
to prevent the appreciation of the Yuan, since the exchange rates have a direct effect on 
imports and exports, these interventionist monetary policies are important instruments to 
protect domestic producers, which contributes to the growing Chinese trade surplus. 
Moreover, the authors highlighted government intervention on Yuan since the '90s: 
 
''From 1994 to 2005, the Chinese government kept the Yuan's exchange rate 
constant at 8.28 against the dollar. After external pressure, China appreciated its 
currency somewhat and the rate, in 2010, was 6.83 against the dollar. The same 
 
27 Ibidem, p. 18. 
28 Ibidem, p. 09 and 12 
29 MERCATUS CENTER GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, op.cit. 
30 PERES, Ana Luísa Soares; DAIBERT, Leticia, op.cit., p. 401. 
2020 





Revista Relações Internacionais do Mundo Atual Unicuritiba.  
 [Received/Recebido: Dezembro 01, 2020; Accepted/Aceito: Dezembro 15, 2020] 
 
Este obra está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0 Internacional.
  
occurred with the rate yuan /euro after many years devalued, suffered a small 
appreciation, mainly after the financial collapse. However, the Chinese currency 
remains, at a much lower value compared to those of other economic powers'' 
(translated)  
 
Recently, due to the Trade War between China and USA, the Yuan has seen 
three phases of devaluation since the beginning of 2018, especially the two sharp 
devaluations in 2019 were generally interpreted as a response to the announced US tariffs 
on all Chinese imports since they were preceded by announcements of new US import 
duties on Chinese goods.31 
Although according to Braml and Steininger32 China uses the devaluation of the 
Yuan as leverage in the trade dispute, as well as, US President Donald Trump once in a 
while accuses China of currency manipulation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
does not see any signals for currency manipulation in the sense of an artificially low 
exchange rate33. 
Further, Soares and Daibert34 argue that currency manipulation is not exclusive 
to the Chinese government since in the 2008 financial crisis several countries (among 
them US, EU and Japan) devalued their currencies as a way to encourage economic 
growth. 
Another of the mentioned distortions is the act of taking advantage of Chinese 
large population, who often works in precarious conditions. Known as social dumping, the 
use of cheaper labor forces or work exploitation to reduce the cost of the production is 
considered an unfair advantage since as a result, Chinese products become cheaper and 
disrupt the competition, as well as, the country attracts new investment and business 
based on cheaper salaries and poor labor laws. Considering China as a major trade player 
in the global market, and therefore, a host to several factories of transnational companies, 
 
31 BRAML, Martin T.; STEININGER Marina. Giving Away Wealth? Trade Effects of the Yuan Devaluation. 
CESifo Forum. Munich, v. 20, n. 04, dec./2019, p. 32 - 35. p. 32. 
32 Ibidem, p. 32 
33 Ibidem, p. 32 
34 PERES, Ana Luísa Soares; DAIBERT, Leticia, op.cit., p. 401. 
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efforts towards improving the condition of the Chinese labor force through WTO have 
been made, nonetheless without results 35. 
Based on the reasons above and in other characteristic NME measures used by 
China, some countries argue that it is difficult to measure whether China firms are 
exporting goods below “fair value”, which interferes to arbitrate dumping margins. 
Therefore, these countries still treat China as a NME in order to be able to use a third 
country as a price reference and then, determine anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures36. 
As a result, China is the main target of US anti-dumping orders, totaling 34% of 
them through December 14, 2018. Besides the quantity, there is also a difference in rates 
among China and other market economies (ME). According to an analysis made by the 
Peterson Institute in 2016, the average anti-dumping duty imposed on cases involving 
China was 81,4%, whereas on cases involving other trading partners was 54,3%37. A 
press release of the US Department of Commerce also highlight this contrast38: 
Image 01: Sample of US anti-dumping rates imposed on Chinese and market 
economies products from 2010 to June 2016  
 
Source: US Department of Commerce press releases. 
 
35 PERES, Ana Luísa Soares; DAIBERT, Leticia, op.cit., p. 402 and 403. 
36 MERCATUS CENTER GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, op. cit., p. 02 
37 MERCATUS CENTER GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, op. cit., p. 02. 
38 FEDERATION OF AMERICANS SCIENTISTS. China’s Status as a Nonmarket Economy (NME). 
Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10385.pdf. Access on: 19 sep. 2019. 
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In this analysis, the first and last columns present the difference between anti-
dumping rates in China and other market economies, while the middle one are cases in 
which Chinese exporters were able to prove that its products were traded according to 
market conditions and therefore, obtained a different rate. Along with notorious higher 
rates imposed to China and its big difference, if compared to market economies (more 
than double in most of them), it is also possible to identify that in 5 out 6 cases in which 
Chinese exporters had separate rates they were still higher than the ones for market 
economies, even though both allegedly trade in same conditions. 
In addition to these anti-dumping rates, countervailing measures ranging from 2% 
to 256%, were also imposed in all the cases39. Concerned with the impact of state-owned 
enterprises' (SOE) activities on the proper functioning of international trade, these 
measures are used by the US, EU and Japan in trade with China, to offset the subsidy 
allegedly granted to SOEs and favored domestic industries. According to a joint report of 
the US Trade Representatives and US Department of Commerce, China has repeatedly 
engaged in delaying tactics in order to avoid its obligation to submit regular subsidy 
notifications (under WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), as well 
as, consider Chinese State presence in its financial markets a systemic distortion that 
precludes the use of Chinese interest rates and yield rates for countervailing duty loan 
benchmarking purpose40. 
Although China has accomplished significant progress in increasing the 
operational autonomy of SOE's, over 80% of central SOEs have finalized the process of 
establishing a board of directors, the Party still play a leadership role in SOEs through the 
creation of a representative committee (Party Committee) in the enterprises. According to 
Zhou, Gao and Bai, in their paper regarding China's SOEs reform, they became even 
 
39 FEDERATION OF AMERICANS SCIENTISTS, op. cit. p. 01 - 02. 
40 INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION. Subsidies enforcement annual report  to the 
congress: joint report of the office of the United States Trade Representative and the United States 
Department of Commerce. Available at: 
https://esel.trade.gov/esel/groups/public/documents/web_resources/seo-annual-report-2018.pdf. Access 
on: 29 apr. 2020. p. 05 and 13. 
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more influential in the country's economy, bolstering the state sector and consolidating 
China's state capitalism41. 
To the authors the control of SOEs by the State/Party is not a problem itself, 
however, these enterprises may not behave like private ones, making decisions based on 
political goals rather than business objectives. In this regard, the WTO Police Trade 
Review mentions an IMF report which suggests that China should increase the role of 
market forces by reducing implicit subsidies to SOEs and opening more key sectors to 
private investment42. 
As a result, anti-dumping rates and countervailing duties are often discussed 
through WTO disputes involving China. The disputes chosen indicate a trade conflict with 
the USA, triggered by other disputes or economic measures used as retaliation and 
presenting disputes in which the NME traits in China's economy are contested. 
In 2009 (DS 399: US - Tyres), China requested consultations with the USA 
concerning increased tariffs on certain passenger vehicle and light truck tyres. According 
to the US, this measure is justified under the paragraph 16 of China's Accession Protocol 
in which a WTO member can apply a safeguard measure in cases where Chinese imports 
are "increasing rapidly" so as to be a "significant cause" of material damage to domestic 
industry43. 
According to China, this allegedly market disruption that injured the domestic 
industry is not properly justified under the mentioned paragraph, article XIX of GATT 
199444 and the Agreement on Safeguards, as well as, is inconsistent with the article I also 
of GATT 199445. However, according to the Panel, in fact, the US was successful in 
demonstrating that subject imports were increasing rapidly, both absolutely and relatively, 
 
41ZHOU , Weihuan; GAO; Henry; BAI, Xue. China’s SOE reform: using WTO rules to build a market 
economy. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Cambridge, v. 68, nº 04, 2019, p. 977- 1022. 
p.980, 985 and 991. 
42 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW, op. cit. p. 18. 
43 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. WTO Dispute Settlement: one-page case summaries 1995-2016. 
Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2017. p. 245. 
44 Regarding emergency action on imports of particular products, mainly the application of safeguard 
measures 
45 Regarding general most-favoured-nation treatment 
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in accordance with the Protocol, being then the ''significant cause'' of material injury. China 
appealed but the Appellate Body also upheld the Panel's finding46. 
One year later, China's application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties in 
US grain-oriented flat-rolled electrical steel (GOES) gave rise to DS 414 - China GOES. 
Accused of violations in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
China lost the dispute and reinvestigate the matter, as a result, reduced anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties to all exporters, although for US ones the duties remained the same. 
The unchanged duties were brought to WTO, which found a number of violations in 
China’s reinvestigation decisions however, the duties measures had already expired47. 
Zhou and Zhang believe this dispute was likely motivated by retaliation, since 
earlier the US initiated one of its largest anti-dumping investigations against China's steel 
pipelines, in order to protect its own domestic industry. The authors add that besides 
China being the US main target, the country steel industry also endured high anti-dumping 
and countervailing rates not only from the US but also from the EU, Australia and India.48  
A similar dispute occurred in DS 427 China - Broiler Products. Known as the 
Chicken Tariff,  in 2010 China imposed different anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
to US exporters if compared to other countries. Losing the WTO dispute, China made a 
reinvestigation, decreasing the countervailing measures and increasing the anti-dumping 
ones to some US exporters49. In 2018, the Dispute Settlement Body concluded that the 
respondent has not complied with the rulings50. 
According to Zhou and Zhang, this was another escalated trade war between the 
countries, a retaliation to US ban on the importation of Chinese poultry in 2009 (DS 392 
US - Poultry51) and the application of safeguard measures (35% import tariff) on certain 
 
46 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, op. cit., p. 245. 
47 ZHOU, Weihuan; ZHANG, Shu. Anti-dumping Practices and China’s Implementation of WTO 
Rulings. The China Quarterly, Cambridge, v. 230, p. 512 - 527, jun./2017. p. 518 and 519.  
48 Ibidem, p. 518 e 519. 
49 ZHOU, Weihuan; ZHANG, Shu, op. cit., p. 521 
50 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, op. cit. 
51 Similar to DS 414 - China GOES by the time WTO decision should be implemented, the measure had 
already expired.  
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passenger vehicle and light truck tyres exported from China (DS 399: US - Tyres, 
mentioned above)52.  
Since China is the largest exporter of goods, it is natural that the country is also 
involved in several WTO disputes, after all, it develops the main role within the 
Organization53. However, among the 44 disputes in which China takes part as a 
respondent, more than half of them (23) have the US as a complainant, indicating a long 
history of trade conflicts between the countries54.  
Under allegations of not operate in market principles and still being designated by 
some countries as a non-market economy, China is concerned with multilateral trade 
remedy rules, specifically addressing the US in some of the issues in its proposal to WTO 
reform. Above all, China continuously seeks to break off the non-market economy label 
that, according to the country, should have been abandoned since 2016. Meanwhile, the 




4. CHINA'S PROPOSAL ON WTO REFORM 
 
After the EU and the US, China is the biggest respondent in WTO disputes. As a 
central piece of WTO trade and conflicts, China also has singular traits of non-market 
economies in its commerce, such as the extensive role of SOEs in the county's state 
capitalism55. With a different economic model and as an influential trade partner, China 
brings distinct approaches in its WTO proposal reform56 to improve WTO mechanisms 
 
52 ZHOU, Weihuan; ZHANG, Shu, op. cit., p. 522. 
53 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, op. cit. 
54 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. Disputes by member. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm. Access on: 29 apr. 2020.  
55 ZHOU, Weihuan; GAO; Henry; BAI, Xue , op. cit, p. 981. 
56 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. CHINA'S PROPOSAL ON WTO REFORM, WT/GC/W/773, 13 mai. 
2019. Available at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
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and solve some of its problems. Among its proposed reforms, the first three are addressed 
directly or indirectly the US: 
China considers crucial and important to solve the impasse of the appointment 
process of the Appellate Body members. The problem consists of a blockage made by 
the US, for this reason, the Appellate Body (normally composed of seven members) no 
longer has the minimum three members needed to hear new appeals, after two of the 
reaming members' terms expired in December of 201957. 
China presented a joint proposal58 to reform the Appellate Body. Acknowledging 
the independence and impartially of the Appellate Body, as well as, the importance to 
make new appointments with no further delay, the proposed reforms address to 
transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members, 90-day timeframe for appellate 
proceedings, the status of municipal law, findings unnecessary for dispute resolution and 
the issue of precedent.  
The other two problems specifically mention a certain member that in China's 
vision has taken actions incompatible to WTO and/or United Nations (UN) rulings such as 
unilateralist measures of raising trade barriers, the imposition of tariffs in an arbitrary way, 
the imposition of economic sanctions and the use of national security as a pretext to 
impose unwarranted tariffs on steel and aluminum products, also threatening to raise 
tariffs on auto and auto parts. 
As a solution, in both cases, China advocates for allowing affected members to 
be able to take prompt and effective remedies. This measure, together with an 
acceleration of relevant dispute settlement proceedings, would aid in an enhancement of 
the multilateral review mechanism, so the unilateralist measures could be constrained. 
Likewise, it could help an affected member to maintain a balance between rights and 
 
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=254127&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=371857150
&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=False&HasSpanishRecord=False. Access on: 19 set. 2019. 
57 JURIST. The WTO Appellate Body Crisis: How We Got Here and What Lies Ahead?. Available at: 
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/04/rathore-bajpai-wto-appellate-body-crisis/. Access on: 24 aor. 
2020.  
58 Together with European Union, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, Republic 
of Korea, Iceland, Singapore, Mexico, Costa Rica and Montenegro 
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obligations under WTO in cases where national security exception is adopted, in which 
China also suggests that notifications requirements should be enhanced and carry out 
multilateral reviews. 
To Prazeres59, the US considered its use of national security exception consistent 
with WTO regulations, nonetheless it also considers the retaliatory measures as WTO's 
violations, bringing them its own WTO disputes against it. So according to the author, 
China's proposal to take effective remedies could provide a member's right to respond 
trade restrictions without discussing whether the measure adopted is legal under WTO 
exception of national security or not, as well as, spare WTO system from spin-off cases 
of national security problems (like the ones initiated by the USA) being, in the author's 
vision, a timely and effective response to trade measures covered by the allegation of 
national security and more favorable than waiting to a panel's ruling and the other party's 
compliance. 
Regarding the inclusiveness of the multilateral trading system, China highlights 
the deficiency in recognizing the systemic gaps between developing and developed 
Members, considering that development is in the center of WTO's goals. Therefore, 
special and different treatment measures to developing countries should be properly 
implemented with provisions more precise, effective and operational, according to China 
this promotes the reduction of development deficit in trade rules and contribute to the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations 2030 Agenda.  
On this subject, China presented a joint proposal60 suggesting the following 
measures61: 
 
''First, enhance the implementation and monitoring of existing special and different 
treatment (S&D) provisions, particularly the implementation of Duty-Free and 
Quota-Free treatment and the Preferential Treatment to Services and Service 
Suppliers of the LDCs. Second, provide more targeted and concrete technical 
 
59 PRAZERES, Tatiana Lacerda. Trade and National Security: Rising Risks for the WTO. World Trade 
Review, Cambridge, v. 19, p. 137-148, 2020. p. 146, 147 and 148.  
60 Together with India, South Africa, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Kenya, Cuba, Central African Republic and Pakistan 
61 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. CHINA'S PROPOSAL ON WTO REFORM, op. cit, p. 07. 
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assistance to ensure the integration of developing Members into the multilateral 
trading system and global value chains. Third, advance the negotiations on S&D 
provisions in accordance with the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Fourth, accord 
adequate and effective S&D treatment to developing Members in future 
negotiations on trade and investment rules. Fifth, encourage developing Members 
to actively assume obligations commensurate with their level of development and 
economic capability''.  
 
According to Professor Xiankun Lu62 China still considers itself a developing 
economy since its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is only 1/7 of that of the US 
and lower than St. Lucia, Grenada and the Maldives. However, the country also 
understands its position as a large economy, leader in many technological advances and 
by other measures more developed than the mentioned Grenada or the Maldives. For this 
reason, the proposal also recognizes that the country should undertake obligations 
proportionally to its economic level and economic capacity. A position already supported 
by some recent measures such as the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, in which China 
accepted similar obligations to developed countries. 
Another common plead included in the reform proposal refers to the fair 
competition when SOEs are involved. According to China, SOEs and other enterprises 
are equal market players. Therefore it considers discriminatory the differentiated rules 
applied to them, such as the label of ''public bodies'' within the Agreement of Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures63 which set additional transparency requirements and 
disciplines for SOEs. Therefore, China proposes an environment of fair competition 
among enterprises of different ownership based on the non-discrimination principle by 
discussing discriminatory disciplines on SOE's regarding subsidies and conducting 
impartial foreign investment security reviews. 
 
62 INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE. China’s 
perspectives on WTO reform. Available at: https://iit.adelaide.edu.au/news/list/2019/11/26/chinas-
perspectives-on-wto-reform. Access on: 24 apr. 2020.  
63 This Agreement establishes a definition of the term “subsidy”. According to the requirements the subsidy 
is given ''by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member''. Regarding this matter, China 
complains that by labeling its SOEs as public bodies the Members could include these enterprises in the 
subsidy concept and therefore can be subject to countervailing measures.  More about the SCM Agreement 
in: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm 
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In light of the difficulty to measure the impact of NMEs and SOEs in trade and 
competition, Zhou, Gao and Bai highlight the importance to ensure the WTO transparency 
principle. Likewise, the authors consider that the information on SOE provided by China's 
Trade Policy Review (TPR) in 2016 is too sparse, indicating a significant shortage of 
transparency. The lack of compromise64 worsened in its last TPR in 2018, in which China 
provided almost no further information related SOEs and SOEs reform65. 
The authors also sustain the use of the ''public body'' designation to Chinese 
SOEs. In the dispute US - Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (DS 449) the Appellate 
Body ruled that a public body is an entity that has the authority to function as an extension 
of the government. Although this authority based concept is more severe compared to the 
ownership approach the authors believe that there is evidence enough to consider China's 
SOE public bodies. The ongoing reform has divided SOEs in: public welfare, special 
commercial and general commercial, while the first two play an admittedly role in providing 
strategies to implement national strategies in the last the Party still participates in the 
decision-making, used to achieve state policies66.  
Moreover, China's proposal also includes measures regarding efficiency of WTO 
subsidiary bodies, compliance of notification obligation, e-commerce, fisheries subsidies, 
inequity in rules on agriculture, among others. 
Allied to its distinctive economy, China's relevance in global trade still rises up 
discussions in WTO, since the mechanisms offered within the Organization are often not 
considered enough to deal with an economy that is not fully driven by market forces. As a 
result, while China seeks fair and equal treatment, the other Members fight against the 
allegedly market distortions caused by China's trade. 
 
64 The mentioned authors highlight that the limitations and ineffectiveness of the WTO transparency 
mechanisms is generalized. However, due to SOE role in China's economy, the lack of transparency could 
create bigger challenges to WTO. 
65 ZHOU , Weihuan; GAO; Henry; BAI, Xue. op. cit. p. 1001 and 1002. 
66 The authors specifically mention a State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of 
the State Council (SASAC) Party Committee on 3rd January 2017 which mention as a power of the Party 
''to ensure the implementation of guidelines and polices of the Party and the State by the company, the 
implementation of major strategic decisions by the Party Central Committee and the State Council''. 
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5. CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS 
 
After the EU and the US, China is the biggest respondent in WTO disputes. As a 
central piece of WTO trade and conflicts, China also has singular traits of non-market 
economies in its commerce, such as the extensive role of SOEs in the county's state 
capitalism . With a different economic model and as an influential trade partner, China 
brings distinct approaches in its WTO proposal reform  to improve WTO mechanisms and 
solve some of its problems. Among its proposed reforms, the first three are addressed 
directly or indirectly the US: 
China considers crucial and important to solve the impasse of the appointment 
process of the Appellate Body members. The problem consists of a blockage made by 
the US, for this reason, the Appellate Body (normally composed of seven members) no 
longer has the minimum three members needed to hear new appeals, after two of the 
reaming members' terms expired in December of 2019 . 
China presented a joint proposal  to reform the Appellate Body. Acknowledging 
the independence and impartially of the Appellate Body, as well as, the importance to 
make new appointments with no further delay, the proposed reforms address to 
transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members, 90-day timeframe for appellate 
proceedings, the status of municipal law, findings unnecessary for dispute resolution and 
the issue of precedent.  
The other two problems specifically mention a certain member that in China's 
vision has taken actions incompatible to WTO and/or United Nations (UN) rulings such as 
unilateralist measures of raising trade barriers, the imposition of tariffs in an arbitrary way, 
the imposition of economic sanctions and the use of national security as a pretext to 
impose unwarranted tariffs on steel and aluminum products, also threatening to raise 
tariffs on auto and auto parts. 
As a solution, in both cases, China advocates for allowing affected members to 
be able to take prompt and effective remedies. This measure, together with an 
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acceleration of relevant dispute settlement proceedings, would aid in an enhancement of 
the multilateral review mechanism, so the unilateralist measures could be constrained. 
Likewise, it could help an affected member to maintain a balance between rights and 
obligations under WTO in cases where national security exception is adopted, in which 
China also suggests that notifications requirements should be enhanced and carry out 
multilateral reviews. 
To Prazeres , the US considered its use of national security exception consistent 
with WTO regulations, nonetheless it also considers the retaliatory measures as WTO's 
violations, bringing them its own WTO disputes against it. So according to the author, 
China's proposal to take effective remedies could provide a member's right to respond 
trade restrictions without discussing whether the measure adopted is legal under WTO 
exception of national security or not, as well as, spare WTO system from spin-off cases 
of national security problems (like the ones initiated by the USA) being, in the author's 
vision, a timely and effective response to trade measures covered by the allegation of 
national security and more favorable than waiting to a panel's ruling and the other party's 
compliance. 
Regarding the inclusiveness of the multilateral trading system, China highlights 
the deficiency in recognizing the systemic gaps between developing and developed 
Members, considering that development is in the center of WTO's goals. Therefore, 
special and different treatment measures to developing countries should be properly 
implemented with provisions more precise, effective and operational, according to China 
this promotes the reduction of development deficit in trade rules and contribute to the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations 2030 Agenda.  
On this subject, China presented a joint proposal  suggesting the following 
measures : 
''First, enhance the implementation and monitoring of existing special and 
different treatment (S&D) provisions, particularly the implementation of Duty-Free and 
Quota-Free treatment and the Preferential Treatment to Services and Service Suppliers 
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of the LDCs. Second, provide more targeted and concrete technical assistance to ensure 
the integration of developing Members into the multilateral trading system and global 
value chains. Third, advance the negotiations on S&D provisions in accordance with the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration. Fourth, accord adequate and effective S&D treatment to 
developing Members in future negotiations on trade and investment rules. Fifth, 
encourage developing Members to actively assume obligations commensurate with their 
level of development and economic capability''.  
According to Professor Xiankun Lu  China still considers itself a developing 
economy since its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is only 1/7 of that of the US 
and lower than St. Lucia, Grenada and the Maldives. However, the country also 
understands its position as a large economy, leader in many technological advances and 
by other measures more developed than the mentioned Grenada or the Maldives. For this 
reason, the proposal also recognizes that the country should undertake obligations 
proportionally to its economic level and economic capacity. A position already supported 
by some recent measures such as the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, in which China 
accepted similar obligations to developed countries. 
Another common plead included in the reform proposal refers to the fair 
competition when SOEs are involved. According to China, SOEs and other enterprises 
are equal market players. Therefore it considers discriminatory the differentiated rules 
applied to them, such as the label of ''public bodies'' within the Agreement of Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures  which set additional transparency requirements and 
disciplines for SOEs. Therefore, China proposes an environment of fair competition 
among enterprises of different ownership based on the non-discrimination principle by 
discussing discriminatory disciplines on SOE's regarding subsidies and conducting 
impartial foreign investment security reviews. 
In light of the difficulty to measure the impact of NMEs and SOEs in trade and 
competition, Zhou, Gao and Bai highlight the importance to ensure the WTO transparency 
principle. Likewise, the authors consider that the information on SOE provided by China's 
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Trade Policy Review (TPR) in 2016 is too sparse, indicating a significant shortage of 
transparency. The lack of compromise  worsened in its last TPR in 2018, in which China 
provided almost no further information related SOEs and SOEs reform . 
The authors also sustain the use of the ''public body'' designation to Chinese 
SOEs. In the dispute US - Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (DS 449) the Appellate 
Body ruled that a public body is an entity that has the authority to function as an extension 
of the government. Although this authority based concept is more severe compared to the 
ownership approach the authors believe that there is evidence enough to consider China's 
SOE public bodies. The ongoing reform has divided SOEs in: public welfare, special 
commercial and general commercial, while the first two play an admittedly role in providing 
strategies to implement national strategies in the last the Party still participates in the 
decision-making, used to achieve state policies .  
Moreover, China's proposal also includes measures regarding efficiency of WTO 
subsidiary bodies, compliance of notification obligation, e-commerce, fisheries subsidies, 
inequity in rules on agriculture, among others. 
Allied to its distinctive economy, China's relevance in global trade still rises up 
discussions in WTO, since the mechanisms offered within the Organization are often not 
considered enough to deal with an economy that is not fully driven by market forces. As a 
result, while China seeks fair and equal treatment, the other Members fight against the 
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